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Marx suggérait que, de loin en loin, quelques individus parvenaient a
se libérer Si Completement des positions qui leur stint assignées clans
l’espace social qu'ils pouvaient appréhender cet espace comme un tout et
transmettre leur vision a ceux qui som encore prisormiers de la structure.
Pierre Bourdieu‘
in his Seminar on L/éthiquede la psychanalysc,Jacques Lacan draws a
distinction between the "knave” and the “fool“ as two intellectual
types:2 "the rightvwing intellectual,” Slavoj Ziiek elucidates, “is a knave,
a conformist who considers the mere existence of the given order as an
argument for it, and mocks the Left for its ’utopian’ plans, which neces-
sarily lead to catastrophe; while the left—wing intellectual is a tool, a
court jester who publicly displays the lie of the existing order, but in a
way which suspends the performative efficiency of his speech/’3 While
preparing a response to Miguel Angelde la Torre’s “Confesiomrs de Mi
macho culumo,“I I was inspired by the "foolishness” of our colleague’s
task, namely, to expose how he, as both a Hispanic and an academic,
has been complicit with those forms of life that perpetuate intra.
Hispanic violence, specifically in the modes of classism, racism, and
sexism. In other words, the purpose of our colleague’s “confession" in
SPierre Bourdieu, Home acadz’micus (Paris: Editions do Minuit, 1984) 47,
7Iacques Lacan, Le Sémlimire, lime VII: Xétlziqmvdc la psych/malysc (Paris:
Editions clu Seuil, 1986), XIV, “Humour du procliain," 2146,
3SlavojZiiek, “Holding the Place," in Judith Butler, Bmesto Inclau, and Slavo}
Ziiek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left
(London: Verso, 2000) 32445.
‘ Forthcoming in Perspectizms:Occasional Papers (Princeton, NJ: Hispanic ’l"he0-
log’cal Initiative).
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this essaymto use the language of psychoanalysis—43 to make manifest
what has been repressed, and by so doing, to overcome the real (vio'
lence) that lurked behind the symptom (macliismo). And this is why you
miss the point if you remain fixated on the way our colleague has cont
structed and applied his class-gender—racematrix. The virtue of ”Com
ftTSlOIlt‘Sdc un macho album” is found elsewhere, at a second level of
abstraction if you will: De la Torre challenges us to reect on the ways
we, as Hispanics and academics, perpetuate forms of intra-Hispanic
violence, both in our communities and our scholarship. US. Hispanic
theology needs more “fools” like you, de la Torre! We need more scholars
that are willing to turn their tools of analysis on themselves, and,
through this reexive gesture, unmask and destabilize the violence that
lurks behind our own life—worlds and scholarship
Given a society dominated by the liberal belief in the possibility of
a harmonious ”multiculturalism,” a Hispanic community which is too
often oblivious to the pernicious forces of assimilation and forms of
“intra-Hispanic” violence, and an academy dominated by the pragma—
tist myth of an integrated community of scholars, it takes the prophetic
"foolishness” of a scholar that is willing to step outside the symbolic
order, to expose and subvert the logic of hegemony that penetrates US.
society, our communities, and the academy. What if this quixotic ges—
ture of the dialectic of self—critiquewas the only authentic act for US,
Hispanic theologians? What if a radical intellectual de~centering via
reexivity was the only way to ensure that we do not become part of
the problem—~that we do not become arielistas and/ or malinchistus?
”Creo que se puede intentar la santa cruzada do it a rescatar el sepulcro
del Caballero de la Locura del poder de los hidalgos cle la Razon . . ,
Lo guardan para que el Caballero no resucite . . .”5
The time has come for US, Hispanic theologians and scholars of
religion to take stock. The time has come for us to systematically reect
on our intellectual genealogies, our projects, publications, our termi-
nology, our interlocutors, The time has come for us to reect upon the
emergence and institutionalization of the study of US. Hispanic reli-
gion, as well as upon our position in the academy and the academy's
position in US. society. As the demographic transition transpires and
Hispanics become the largest minority group in the United States, and
correlatively, as we Latina /o theologians and scholars of religion
increase in number and move toward the center of the academy, it is
imperative that we systematically reect upon where we’ve come
from, where we are, and where we are going, lest we lose sight of our
“Miguel de Unamuno, Vida (11*Don Quljott?y Slmclm (Madrid: Alianza Editorial,
1987) 9—10.
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liberationist task; lest we become part of the problem. “Nosotros, los de
entonces, ya no somos los mismos . . ,"t
In that spirit, this essay calls for what since the time of lmmanuel
Kant has been termed critique—that is, a critique of US. Hispanic theol—
ogy and the study of US. Hispanic religion. In other words, this essay
calls for a reflection on the conditions of possibility for the emergence
and transformation of the study of us. Hispanic religion, Let me be
clear and get to the heart of the matter: critique here is not to be under.
stood as the Kantian, NeOvKantian, or phenomenological proiect of
reecting on the conditions of possibility of transcendental categories
of thought, morality, or judgment, universal values, cultural forms,
linguistic structures, and religious a prioris. For we would then be
falling captive to the idealism that both Latin American liberation the-
ology and liberation philosophy have warned us about, an idealism
that legitimated the interlocked endeavors of the Enlightenment and
Conquest'Colonization. Nor is critique here to be understood as the
pragmatist project of reecting on the conditions of possibility of a com-
munity of scholars that always reach understanding through certain
procedures. For we would then be falling captive to the liberal “inte—
grationist" ideology that so suffuses our lives, the same liberal ideologythat legitimated US. hegemony in Latin America. This liberal world—
view generates what in Hegelese can be called the spurious litalogia de
conjunto: that is, the vacuous idea of a communitarian theology that is
given, already there, in contradistinction to something that emerges
only after the life-and-death struggle for recognition has taken place.
Rather, critique here, as I am using the term, is to be understood as the
critical philosophical and theoretical project of reecting on the condi-
tions of possibility of a scholarly knowledge and a set of academic
practices that are produced in a society suffused with power asymme—
tries, a society that is always contested and never harmonious, and this
holds a fortiori if you are a minority. Understood in this sense, critiqueis always dialectical, and, for us, it becomes the task of reecting on the
possibilities of the study of us. Hispanic religion in light of what his-
torically has been known as the problem of knowledge.7Only this under—
standing of the relationship between knowledge and the real—life
Wablo Neruda, Veinta poemas dc amor y mm caution zlrsespemdu in Ohms com-
pletes (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1956) 77‘78.
7Space permits only a few comments: The i ight that all knowledge is socially
constituted was first given systematic philosophical form at the end of 19th century
through the critique of positivism. ’lhus emerged the problem ufknowlcdgl'.Charles S.Peirce repudiated the notion that scientic progress was linked to the internal dia—
lectic of methodological principles deduced from the a priori laws of a Kantian tranv
scendental consciousness. He understood scientific growth, rather, as a logic of
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process will produce the, true leologz’adc conjunto~that is, a communi-
tarian theology that receives its substance and is realized only by tarry—
ing with forms of intra—lrlispanic violence and the threat of intellectual
assimilation.
This project we are calling the critique of the study of US. Hispanic
religion is not something that can be accomplished in an essay; nor is it
something that a handful of theologians and scholars of religion can
realize on their own. If it is to be efficacious, and if it is to be an exercise
that changes both our academic practices and our intellectual para—
digms, the project of critique must be carried out by the community of
Hispanic theologians and scholars of religion in an institutional frame“
work. Perhaps the next ACHTUS meeting can be dedicated to this
endeavor of self—critique? Perhaps the next anthology on Hispanic the-
ology can engage this proiect? The purpose of this essay is thus very
limited: first, to argue the need to develop a critique of the study of US.
Hispanic religion; second, to propose what such a project would entail.
In a word, the purpose of this essay, as the title intimates, is to marshal
a prnpaedeutic to the critique of the study U 5, Hispanic religion.As we shall
see, this project necessarily implies a polemic against intellectual as-
similation.
I contend that the critique of the study of US, Hispanic religion, if
it is to be carried out appropriately, must include four tasks. First, we
must expound the philosophical and theoretical point of departure for
our critique, which, as I have already suggested, should be the problem
of knowledge. For reasons that will become clear below, this point of
departure must be developed from two perspectives: from above, a
inquiry that functions through the semiotic mediation of a community of investigav
tors. And here we have the Peirceian pragmatic turn: Scientic truth is understood
as the correspondence between an on object of inquiry, scientic signs and a com~
munity of scientists, Collected Papers. Volume V. Pragmatism and Pragmatism (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), Paragraph 311, 186-7 and Paragraph 553,
390—1, Similarly, Wilhelm Dilthey marshaled a critique of the cognitive reduction-
ism of the nomological sciences, arguing that all theoretical knowledge must be
understood against the backdrop of a pie—scientific lifeworld of intersubjectively
shared meaning structures. Introduction In the Human Sciences, in Wilhelm Dilihcy:
Salaried Works, Vol. 1, eds. Rudolf A, Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton, NJ;
Princeton University Press, 1989) 448. Epistemology he contended, was not grounded
in the structure of cognition, but rather in the beingvtheir-ior—meof a totality of lived
experience. For Dilthey, thus, the problem of knowledge was ultimately a problem
of meaning—n problem that could only be properly addressed by a philosophical
hermeneutics. Patterns and Morning in History: llumghts on History and Society, ed.
H. P. Rickman (New York: Harper 'l‘orchbooks, l962) 79. This line of thought would
provide the ground for the phenomenological critiques of positivism expounded by
Edmund l‘lusserl (The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenome-
nology) and Martin l’leidegger (The Question Concerning hiclniolagyand Other Essays).
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critical theoretical, archaeological, and world-systems perspective to
the problem of knowledge; from below, an ethnographic sociological
perspective on intellectual production and the academic field. ln a
second task, which would correspond to the approach from above to
the problem of knowledge, we must attempt to elucidate the two para-
digms involved in the emergence and development of the study of
Latino religion: the liberationist paradigm which emerged in Latin
America during the 1960s; and the liberal paradigm which crystallized
as the central discourse in the US. academy with the emergence of
pragmatism at the end of the nineteenth century. For our third task,
which would correspond to the approach to the problem of knowledge
from below, we must reconstruct the genesis and transformation of the
study of US. Hispanic religion, However, it' we are to be consistent
with the challenges posed to us by the problem of knowledge, we must
understand this third task specifically as the analysis of the develop-
ment of a particular section of the US. academic field constituted by
certain stocks of knowledge, a specific community of scholars and in-
stitutions which materialized around the “invention” of a particular-
object of analysis—US. Hispanic religion. Finally, for our fourth task
we must seek to construct a new ground for the study of US. Hispanic
religion which, taking as its point of departure the conscious and un-
conscious struggle of Hispanics in the US, academy against intellec~
tual assimilation elucidated via the critical reconstruction developed
through the first two tasks—that is, elucidated via the ”foolish” gesture
of reflexivity—sets out to destabilize the dominant philosophical
presuppositions, theories, and interpretations of religion in the US.
academy. And, then, in the space opened up by critique, as a second
moment of this fourth task, we should aim to elucidate, rst, the phe-
nomenology of struggle as the point of departure for the analysis of
us. Hispanic reality, and, second, the ideological and emancipatory
aspects of Hispanic religion, both of which have been suppressed by
the liberal tendencies of the US. academy. Following is an outline of
the four tasks I argue should constitute the critique of the study of US,
Hispanic religion:
Four Tasks Constituting the Critique of the
Study of US. Hispanic Religion
The First Task:
Exposition of the Problem of Knowledge as the Proper Philosophical
and Theoretical Point of Departure
i. From Above: Critical Theoretical, Archaeological, and World.
systems approach to the Problem of Knowledge
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il, From Below: Scholarly Knowledge, Intellectual Production,
and the Academic Field
The Second Task:
Elucidation of the Liberationist and Liberal Paradigms
i. liberationist Paradigm: Socio~llistorical and Philosophical
Foundations, Scientific Study of Religion, and Theology
ii, Liberal Paradigm: Socio-llistorical and Philosophical Founda—
tion, Scientific Study of Religion, and Theology
The Third Task:
Reconstruction of the Genesis and Transformation of the Study of
us. l‘lispanic Religion
i. Genesis: Between Liberation and Liberalism
ii, Transformation: The Liberalization of the Liberationist l’ara-
digm
The Fourth Task:
‘ ‘
Construction of a New Ground for the Study of US. Hispanic Religion
i. Critique of the US, Academic Field via the Destabilization of
Dominant Interpretations
ii. The Phenomenology of Struggle, and US. Hispanic Religion
as ideology and as Emancipation
The Fl 1 Task:
Exposition of the Problem QfKnowledgr?as the
Proper Philosophical and Theoretical Point of Departure
In the first task we should aim to bring forth the philosophical and
theoretical point of departure, or, in other words, the frame of reference
for the project of critique, Specifically we must demonstrate how the
relationship between knowledge and the real'life process can be ade-
quately grasped only by interlocking two approaches: A social theoreti-
cal, structural, archeological, and worldrsystems approach from above
that aims to analyze the social foundations of knowledge and the cor-
relation between general modes of knowledge and socio‘historical and
structural conditions; and an ethnographically motivated sociology of
knowledge from below that aims to critique the intellectualizing intent
of scholastic knowledge and analyze the relationship between intellec—
tual production and an academic field on the one hand, and the aca-
demic field and its socio—historical location on the other.
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T his endeavor will entail a retrieval of the critical philosophical and
theoretical traditions around the problem of knowledge, such as Karl
Marx’s critique of the ideological function of philosophy and science,“
Friedrich Nietzsche’s repudiation of the autonomy of pure and practical
reason Via his notion of the “will to power,“ Georg Luka’cs’ unmasklng
of the correlation between the scientific method and the capitalist
“Consider the following,Ywell-known passages so often repressed in an acad
emy dominated by the liberal paradigm: ”Division of labor becomes truly such
from the moment when a division of material and mental labor appears, Front this
moment onwards consciousness can really {latter itself that it is something, other
than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something without
representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to emanci~
pate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of ’pure’ theory, theology,
philosophy, ethics, etc, But even it this theory, theology, philosophy, etc, comes into
contradiction with the existing relations, this can only occur because existing social
relations have come into contradiction with existing forces of production." A few
pages later; ”Even this ’pure’ natural science is provided with an aim, as with its
material, only through trade and industry, through the sensuous activity of men,”
And several paragraphs later: ”The ideas of the ruling cl ire in every epoch the
ruling ideas: i,e., the class which is the ruling material tor-cc of society, is at the same
time its ruling intellectual force, The class which has the means of material produc—
tion at its disposal, has conh‘ol at the same time over the means of mental produc.
tion, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means ot
mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal
expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relation-
ships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the
ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance" (The German Ideology,in The Mary
Engels Reader, Second Edition, ed. Robert C. Tucker [New York: W,W. Norton &
Company, 1978} 159—73),
“Nietzsche marshaled a critique of the autonomy of morality and cognition
arguing that human faculties were driven by affects and suffused with interests. In-
tellectual activity was a manifestation of the will to power. This was a repudiation
of the Kantian tradition that grounded its entire project on the transcendental
status, rst of "pure” and “practical reason,” and later values, cultural forms, lan~
guage, and the like: "Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against
the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a “pure, will-less, painless, time—
less knowing subject“; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts
as ‘pure reason,’ ’absolute spirituality,’ ’knowledge in itself“, these always demand
that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no
particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which
alone seeing becomes seeing sumalhlng, are supposed to be lacking; these always
demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a perspective seeing,
only a perspective ’knowing’; and the more affects we allow to speak about one
thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more com~
plete will our ’concepl’ of this thing, our ’objectivity,’ be. But to eliminate the will
altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this—
what would that mean but to castrate the intellect?” (On the Genealogyof Murals rmd
Ecce Homo (New York: Vintage Books, 1967] 119).
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mode of production,m Theodor Adorno’s critique of positivism)1 Max
llorkheimer’s critique of ”traditional theory,"12 Iiirgen Habermas’s
notion of a “critical social science,”“ Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyer-
“*l-ie develops this from the historical and dialectical vantage points: “Thus we
perceive that there is something highly problematic in the fact that capitalist society
is predisposed to harmonise with scientific method, to constitute indeed the social
premises of its exact]
'
. If the internal structure of the ’facts’ of their interconnec—
tions is essentially his 'cal, it, that is to say, they are caught up in a process of con
tinuous transformation, then we may indeed question when the greater scientific
inaccuracy occurs. . i . The historical character of the ‘facts’ which science seems to
have grasped with such ‘purity’ makes itself felt in an even more devastating
manner, As the products of historical evolution they are involved in continuous
change. But in addition they are also precisely in their objectivestructure the products 0/
a definite historical epoch, namely capitalisrli” (Georg Lukacs, History and Class Cori-
sciousn "5; Studies in Marxist Dilllt’c‘flCS [Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 1990] 7).
" Out of the critique of the Enlightenment, in particular the dialectical tradition,
emerges the critical theoretical approach to the problem of knowledge. Adorno
exemplifies this approach. He develops his critique of positivism not as a formal
philosophical problem (Wilhelm Dilthcy, Ernst C assirer, Edmund tlusserl, Martin
Heidegger) but as a SOClO-lllStOriC'dl one. The modern scientific enterprise, in par
ticular the natural sciences, are now understood as a function of a specific social
structure, viz, capitalism. "the philosophy of science and the social and human sciv
ences are also critiqued to the extent that these claim objectivity or neutrality, either
in the hermeneutical or nomological sense, and fail to grasp the contradiction that
defines their social function, Introduction to Sociology (Cambridge, Great Britain:
Polity Pre. , 2000) and Theodor W. Adorno, Hans Albert, Ralf Dahrendorf, lurgen
Habermas, Harald Pilot, and Karl R. Popper, The Pasitivist Dispute in Gmnan Sari»
elegy (New York: Harper Truchbooks, 1976).
‘1 For instance, Horkheimer writes: "The scholarly specialist 'as’ scientist re~
gards social reality and its products as extrinsic to him, and ’as’ citizen exercises his
interest in them through political articles, membership in political parties or social
service organization, and participation in elections. But he does not unify these two
activities, and his other activities as well, except, at best, by psychological inter-
pretation: Critical thinking, on the contrary, is motivated today by the. effort to
transcend the tension and to abolish the opposition between the individual’s purl
posefuln a pontaneity, and rationality, and those work-prov: ‘5 relationships of
which society is built. Critical thought has a concept of man as in conict with him-
self until this opposition is removed.” "Traditional and Critical Theory," Critical
Theory, 20940.
"’l‘labermas delineates a ”critical philosophy of science” which has as its task
the uncovering of the correlation between “logical-methodological rules” and
“knowledge—constitutive interes “There are three categories of processes of in.
quiry for which a
’
ecific conn on between logicalamethodological rules and
knowledge-constitutive interests can be demonstrated. This demonstration is the
task of a critical philosophy of science that escapes the snares of positivism, The
approach of the empirical-analytic sciences incorporates a technical cognitive inter~
est; that of the, h' torical-hermeneutic sciences incorporates a practical one; and the
approach of critically orientated sciences incorporates the emuncipatory cognitive
interest . . .” Knowledgeand Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, l97l) 308.
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abend’s social theoretically motivated critique of the l’opperian phi~
losophy of science,M Michel Foucault’s "archaeological” decentering
of the knowing subject/’1'5 and Immanuel Wallerstein’s ”historical re-
construction of the social sciences/”1”
”The works of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend are significant to the extent
that they advance the critique of knowledge specifically through a social theoreti-
cally motivated critique of the philosophy of science. Both took issue with Poppedan
nee-positivism, repudiating the idea that the natural sciences are structured and
transformed solely through the force of logical-methodological procedures de-
ployed in an autonomous scientic sphere, Karl Popper, I .ogicof ScientificDiscovery
(New York: Basic Books, 1959), Conjecturesand Rofutations(tendon: Routledge, 1989),
and The Open Society and Its Enemies. Vol. 2: The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx
and the Aftermath (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I971), See also lmre
Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970). Both addressed this reification by uncovering
the structural or institutional conditions for the possibility of scientific methods and
theories. Their most poignant attack on traditional philosophies of science was the
insight that ”normal science” was antithetical to critical inquiry. Kuhn’s theory of
"scientific revolutions" rejected the view that scientific growth occurred through
“accretion,” that is through coherent advances gained through formal methodologi.
cal procedures. Rather Kuhn understood scientic growth to be the result of ”para-
digm” shifts caused by structural changes like, for instance, changes in education,
habits, and problemvsolving practices. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure- of Scientific
Revolutions. Third Edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996) and
lmre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). Feyerabend radicalized Kuhn by
making power asymmetries and domination a central aspect of his analysis. the
suggested, for example, that ”interests, forces, propaganda, and brainwashing tech-
niques” play a substantial role in the development of science, and concluded that
the only way to achieve advancements in science was through methodological and
theoretical ”anarchism” Paul l‘eyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Armrcliistic
Theoryof Knowledge(London: Verso, 1975). Albeit from within the strictures of the
philosophy of science, Kuhn and Feyerabend pointed to the importance of a struc-
tural approach to the problem of scientific knowledge.
‘t’ Michel Foucault’s
"archaeology of knowledge,” his methodological and epis~
temological reections on the human sciences, marshals what is perhaps the most
radical critique of the centrality and unity of the knowing subject or community
both at the ontological and epistemological, theoretical and methodological levels,
and thus represents what is perhaps the most devastating critique of the philosophy
of science, the history of ideas, traditional approaches to the sociology of knowledge
(Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Karl Mannheim), and even ol the most critical of the
social theoretical approaches to the problem of knowledge. Unlike the critical theo-
retical tradition which grounds its critique on the Marxist analysis of the relation!
ship between systems of knowledge and socioeconomic conditions, and unlike the
sti'ucturalist tradition which grounds its critique on the, relationship between system
of knowledge and linguistic formations, values, cultural forms, the unconscious, etc,
Foucault’s archaeological critique aims to understand the emergence and develop-
ment of systems of knowledge through the interrelationship of systems of ”dis
courses, statements,” and “archives.” His analysis is aimed at that ontological
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Through this retrieval the following theses are made manifest:
i) All knowledge is socio~historically mediated and has a social
function, and thus, all schola 'hip that fails to reflect on its socio-
historical conditions of possibility functions as ideology.
ii) Discourses on the social world are particularly susceptible to
socio~historical distortions as in the human and social sciences,
the practice of constructing an object of analysis is always con-
ditioned by the specific socio—historical relationship that exists
between the intellectual, the scientific discourse, and the social
reality being interpreted, This is the case because, willy nilly,
scholarly di ourses on the social world have specific—but not
necessarily conscious—‘social investments and interests in that
very world they aim to analyze.
51 cc located between language and socii‘veconomic conditions—4M discursive
space; and its situated in that epistemological space located between philology and
history, psychology and sociology-~the archaeological space. L'Arche'alogicdu savoir
(Paris: (lallimard, WW)
|“Immanuel Wallerstein’s claim that academic and political debates about conv
temporary social reality are not just over the empirical analysis but also over the
tools of analy 5 themselves points to the particularly empirical nature of the episte-
mological problem of the human sciences This is why debates in the human sci-
ences over nomothctic and idiographic approaches, synchronic and diachronic
analysis, objective and subjective modes ol knowledge, and structure and agency
must be understood not only in terms of formal social theoretical categories like
llahermas’s notion of “knowledgeconstituiive interests,” but also in terms of con-
crete empirical conditions—that is, in terms of the socio—historical location of this
debate Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Foucault demonstrated how scholarly knowledge is
always shaped by, and thus must always be understood in terms of larger institu—
tions, paradigms or discourses. Wallerstein demonstrates how these discourses can
only be fully understood against the socio-historical context in which they devel-
oped. Thus, from a "world-systems perspective,” he historically reconstructs the
social 'ciences teasing out the homologies that exist between these sciences and the
soci -l1istorical conditions in which they developed. Diachronically, Wallerstein
traces the changes in the structure of the social sciences sparked by the transforma-
tion of the world system in 1945 and 19891 Synchronically he shows how the north—
south dichotomy which transpired alter the Second World War has also affected the
structure of the social sciences. Unlike lohn Meyer and his olleagues who focus on
integrating effects which global cultural forms have had on intellectual discourses,
Wallerstein argues rather that systemic power asymmetries linked to socio-
economic disparities have been a central socio-historical determinant for the recent
development of the human scient s The End mm» W01 Id 111; We Know It (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1999) and 0pm the Social Sciences Report of the
Guilbmzkian (I ommr's. m on the Rushucluring of the Social Sciences (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, N96)
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iii) The conflicts and contradictions of a particular society manifest
themselves in that society’s academic field in the mode of an
intellectual struggle, and this holds Hrrori for the subvfield of
all those disciplines that have as their proper task discourses on
the social world.
iv) Through the process of critical reflection, that is through the
process of unmaskmg the social determinants of intellectual
practices and production, the academic field is revealed as one
of the loci of the struggle of socially marginalized people: via,
the struggle over the interpretations of the world which is one
dimension—the theoretical dimension—~0f the general struggle.
The second approach to the problem of knowledge will entail an
engagement of Bourdieu’s ethnographically inspired sociology of
knowledge as it complements the “from above" social philosophical
and theoretical, structural, archaeological perspectives, through a cri-
tique of the intellectualizing gaze of scholastic reason, the uncovering
of the logic and interests of academic practices, and the social function
of the academic t'ielcl.‘7 Bourdieu’s insights provide methodological
and theoretical substance to the more formal reections of the retrieval
just outlined, allowing us to build a model that can guide us in our the
analysis of the study of Latino religion, its genesis and transformation.
Paradigms do not float around but are linked via carriers and instituA
tions to a specic set of practices, and thus they are always being nego—
tiated and renegotiated, produced and reproduced on the ground
From below, then, the following emerges: Agents negotiate paradigms
through their continuous interactions with others and institutions, that
is, agents negotiate paradigms through a field With the Bourdieuian
lens, paradigms or discourses are understood as overdetermined
stocks of knowledge intemalized as a habitus actualized in a field. From
above, paradigms—which transcend academic fields, both diachroni-
cally and synchronicallyenable and shape these From below,
however, paradigms appear as epistemological and ontological pre-
suppositions, methodological practices, intellectual genealogies, text
milieus, categories of thought, meta theoretical claims, language
games, which, through the socializing function of education, the disci-
plining function of authoritarian academic structures, and the normal—
ization of intellectual institutions, are always ready to hand, that is,
“Pierre Bourdieu, “Condition de classe el position dc classe,” Archives
Eumpéennes do Socialogic7 (1966) 20149, Le. , s manque (Paris: Minuit, i980), Home
ucndemicus, and Meditations pascalicnm’s.
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always function as the ground or point of departure of any conversa~
tion, curriculum, course, scholarship, research project, conference.
The Second Tusk:
Elucidation of the Lilit'mtioriist and Liberal Paradigms
In the last few years it has become increasingly evident that the
studies of US. Hispanic religion being produced within the US. acad-
emy suffer from a certain kind of intellectual schizophrenia. Both
theological and social scientific approaches to Latino religiosity alike
appear to be caught between what historically have been two antago-
nistic perspectives. On the one hand, Studies of Hispanic religion
understand religion as a vehicle of empowerment, critique, and libera-
tion immersed in a social system defined by antagonism, contradiction,
and domination. As it will become clear below, this perspective can be
traced back to a worldview we will call the liberationist paradigm. On the
other hand, these same studies also work into their analysis an under~
standing of Latino religion as a vehicle of socialization and a promoter
of social harmony and assimilation immersed in a social system which
—in the final analysis—is defined by equilibrium, order, and congru-
ence. Analogously, this second social theoretical approach can be
genealogically linked to a broader intellectual program we will call
here the liberal paradigm. The epistemological, methodological, and
theoretical difficulties that this intellectual ambiguity creates for those
that are interested in the study of Iilispanic religion will only gradually
crystallize through the pages of this work. Likewise, the more general
relationship between intellectual production and existential conditions
which this state of affairs is symptomatic of will slowly emerge. At the
outset we are only able to describe this obfuscation that suffuses a par-
ticular section of the US. academic field we call here the study of His»
panic religion with the following nebulous formulation which has been
abstracted from its own historical development and social conditions:
Analyses of Latino religion are caught between two conicting intellec—
tual worldviews, the liberationist and liberal paradigms.
The second task, then, should deploy the social theoretical, struc'
tural, archeological, and world-systems approach from above in an
attempt to elucidate these two paradigms that historically have been at
play in the genesis and transformation of the field of us. Hispanic reli-
gion, namely, the liberationist and liberal paradigms. It is clear from the
critical theoretical approach to the problem of knowledge elucidated in
the first task that intellectual discourses must be understood as medi-
ated and structured by the socio-historical conditions in which they
emerge. It is not enough simply to iuxtapose forms of thought and
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forms of life. This is especially the case with discourses on the social
world as they aim to analyze the world in which they are produced and
thus are caught not only in an epistemological“double hermeneutic” as
Anthony Giddens has suggested, but also in an empirical, smio-historical
tension,‘8 In this sense it is essential that intellectual paradigms about
the social world be understood socio—historicallylest one fall captive to
reification. And here we find the central epistemological and methodov
logical problems of those approaches to the human sciences that can
be traced back to the repudiation of the philosophy of negation——viz.,
positivism and pragmatismW It is not enough simply to analytically
elucidate the “macro” conditions of a "micro" problem, to mention as
background information those social spheres or elements that are in
practice (i.e., methodologically and theoretically) being held constant,20
or to give lip service to the material substratum of a cultural phenome—
non as, for instance, ethnographers, anthropologists, and sociologists
in the us. tend to do.’1 Rather, social reality must be grasped dialecti-
cally which means historically, structurally, and materially.“ This is
”This is a crucial distinction. As intimated above, though all forms of knowl-
edge are epistemologically mediated by, and dependent on the social world, the
social sciences and other scholarly discourses on the social world such as theology,
because they have the social world as both ground and object of analysis, face at
least two additional epistemological difculties—(me linked to the social world for—
mally understood, and the other linked to the social world empirically understood.
When Anthony Giddens argues that the social sciences face a “double hermeneutic”
he is essentially referring to the first difficulty: The social sciences deploy socially
mediated tools to interpret a world that is already socially meaningful in itself.
Anthony Giddens, New Rules of SociologicalMethods (New York: Basic Books, 1976)
162‘ The second difficulty that all discourses on the social world must face is, how;
ever, potentially more pernicious to the degree to which it is overlooked by the
dominant discourse on epistemology and methodology in the human sciences. This
eclipsed perspective is the one that interests us here. It is the one Bourdieu devel-
ops. Once again: In the human sciences, the practice of constructing an object of
analysis is always conditioned by the specific sociovhistoricdl relationship that
exists between the intellectual and the social reality being interpreted.
”Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Risc of Social Theory
(New York: Humanity Books, 1999), Theodor Adorno, Introduction to Sociology,and
Theodor W. Adomo, Hans Albert, Ralf Dalirendorf, Jiirgen liabermas, Harald Pilot,
and Karl R. Popper, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology.
2“ For example, the infamous criteria paribus condition of non-dialectical econo-
mic theory or the so-called “background," "macro” or “structural" section that is
intended to frame those non—dialectical ethnographic studies.
9‘ See, {or instance, Michael Burawoy’s epistemological and methodological
critiques in Ethnography Unbound: Power and Resistance in the Modem Metropolis
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
.
1‘ Maurice Godelier, “La part idéelle du reel,” I .‘Hommc 13H 4 (July-December
1978) 155—88, Horizon, trajets marxistcs m anthropologic (Paris M pero, W73), and
Ignacio Ellacuria, Filuso‘ath’ In realidud histtirica (El Salvador: UCA Editores, 1990).
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why it is crucial that we understand the philosophical foundations of
the liberationist and liberal paradigms dialectically, in light of their
socio-historical conditions of possibility. In what follows I will briefly
sketchthe central socio~historical factors, and then, the philosophical
toundations of the liberationist and liberal paradigms respectively.
Tue LlBhRA’I’IUNlST l’ARADltxM:
The following six soda-historical factors enabled and shaped the
emergence and development of the Latin American liberationist para-
digmr‘“
it The rise and fall of the Latin American left“
ii. The rise and fall of dependency theory as a viable economic
strategy tor overcoming the conditions of underdevelopment in
Latin America?"
iii, The religious changes that transpired in Latin America after
the Second Vatican Council, in particular the emergence of the
CEIAM conferences within the Roman Catholic Church, the
crystallization of liberation theology, and the growth of radical
l’rotestantismr’“
iv. The crystallization of an autochthonous and politicized cultural
sphere, in particular the development of realism!) mégico in lit-
erature and the emergence of a socially conscious film industry”
“These are a modified version of the soda—historical determinants elucidated
by Eduardo Mendieta, who adapted his from Raul Fornet—Betancourt. Eduardo
Mendieta, "Editor’s introduction," in Enrique Dussel, The Llndursidv of'Moderniiy:
Api’l,Rimeur, Karly, 'lliylnr, and the PhilosophyofLibiimtion (New lerseyhlrlumanitjes
Press, 1996) xiii—xxxi.
“large G, Lastni‘ieda, Utopia desammda: (”trig/ls, dilvmas ypromlrsa dell/1 lzyztierda
en Amérlcu [Mina (Mexico: Joaquin Mortiz / Planeta, 1993).
3" Fernando lienrique Cardoso and l. zo Faletto, Depamlcmrin y desurmllo an
America Latina: msayo dé’ interprelacidn sociulr’igica(Mexico, DE: Siglo Veintiuno
196-9),
,
”Cristian Parker, 0171: Lligicnen Amrrioz Latina: ReligionPopular y Modernizacién
Capitalism (Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 19%);José Miguel Bonino
Rosira del pmhrslrmlismo lailinommrrirmm (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans:
1995); Christian Smith, 7711*Enwrgmce of Liberation Tlmolngy:Radical Religion and
Social Movement Theory (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), and Daniel
Levine, Popular Voices in lull" Anwricmz Catholicism (Princeton, NJ; Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1992),
_
"Alejo Carpentier, Ohms complains, 13: eneayos (Mexico, DE: Siglo Veintiuno
Editores, 1983) and Tomds Qutiérrez Alea, Dialctica do] cspt‘clndnr (la l’labana: EdiA
ciones Union, 1982},
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vi The polemic between Augusto Salazar Bondy and Leopoldo
Zea about the possibility of an authentic Latin American phi-
losophy,”
vi The emergence of neo-liberalism and him-capitalism under the
rubric of globalization as the new hope for Latin American eco«
nomic development.”
Now here are the central philosophical foundations of the libera-
tionist paradigm which should be understood as dialectically related to
the socio—historical conditions just expounded, and should hermeneu-
tically be grasped as an attempt to overcome the conditions of dominav
tion and underdevelopment that suffused the socio‘historical elements
just elucidated:
ii Intellectual Genealogy: The philosophical foundations of the
liberationist paradigm can be traced back to the critique of the
Enlightenment notion of the positive relationship between, on
the one hand, the autonomy of reason and moralvcognitive de-
velopment, and, on the other, social integration and progress,
political liberalism, democratic capitalism, and modemizationf‘“
ii. Philosophy of History: The liberationist paradigm is ontologi'
cally grounded in a dialectical, structural, organic, materialist,
dynamic, and historical understanding of reality. In Latin Amer-
ica, this ontology has been given systematic form through the
philosophy of history}X
1‘“ Leopoldo Zea, El pensmniento Latinnamierirmm (Mexico: Ariel, l97t5) and
Augusto Salazar Bondy, (Exist? mm losufia do nuestm America? (Mexico: Siglo XXI
editores, 1988)
Z“ Francois lioutart and l}. l‘olct, L’ Aum [)azros—>~Mmidmlislztimi dos Réslsltmces ct
dL’Slultes (Paris: L’Hamiattan, 1999), and Alternatives sud, "Les organismes financiers
internationaux, instruments de l’economie politique liberale," (1:2 (1099),
~“‘ Enrique Dussel, Malodo prim mmlosofiudc la lihi'mcitin: Suparacion anal'lica llc‘
la dialecticn liegalianu(Salamanca: Ediciones Sigueme, 1974),
35 Ignacio Ellacuria, Filosofz’alie hi maliduzl his: lot. The construction of a Latin
American philosophy of history can be understood as a repudiation of the positivisl
tic and pragmatic frames of reference that are so central to the project of modernity
and the process of modernization, frames of reference that repudiate the very idea
of a philosophy of history, frames of reference which, for Latin American liberaA
tionists are soda—historically linked to US, hegemony, Pragmatism repudiates the
very notion of a philosophy of history as metaphysical nonsense, "lhis it lead from
Peirce’s repudiation of Kant and Hegel, Fearing the specter of dialectic (Marx),
Popper vehemently and dogmatically rejected the idea that Six‘lo‘historical condi~
tions played a role in the development of science See his response to Kuhn in Criti»
cism and the Growth of Knowledge, Mannheim critiqued US, social thought for its
ahistoricism (Ideologyand Utopia {New York: Harcourt Brace lovanovicli, 1936] 254),
46 Manuel ]. Me/irlo
iii. Social Theoretical Assumptions: The liberationist paradigm
takes as its central social theoretical assumption what Haber-
mas has called the ”theory of social conflict," which “seeks to
understand [the social] system as an association of domination
{Herrschriftsverband}kept open and in flux by internal opposi—
tum?”
iv. Conception of Iust’ice: The Latin American critique of ”justice as
fairness," discourse ethics, and all talk of public spheres takes
as its point of departure the historical underdevelopment,
instability, and colonized status of the Latin American public
sphere,“ From here the contributions of johns Rawls, Haber-
mas, Charles Taylor and Karl~0tto Apel are historicized and
critiqued for reilying forms of thought that are linked to specific
socio-historical conditions. Specifically, Latin American phi.
losophers of liberation have taken issue with the dominant
social ethics of the center for dichotomizing the praxeological
and poietic dimensions; of the everyday (cotidiano), and for fail-
ing to address the question of the material and metabolic sub-
stratum ol’ the lifeworld.“
vi Epistemology: The liberationist epistemology is grounded in
what Habermas has called the “emancipatory cognitive inter-
est” of the ”critically oriented sciences?“
In Latin America in the 19709, the liberationist paradigm enabled
the emergence of a Marxian inspired sociology of religion that aimed
on the one hand to unmask the ideological functions of religion, and on
the other, highlight its empowering dimensions, For example: Francois
Houtart’s and the Louvain School’s Godelierian and Cramscian apv
preaches to religion and society?" Otto Maduro’s investigations into an
authentic Latin American sociology of religion’ and Cristian Parker’s
”Itirgen llabermas, 'l‘lzcoryand Practicr (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973) 210.
l-‘Jorge Castaneda, l.” casa per la vcntnmz: Mexico y America Latina despues dc In
Guerra [-7111(Mexico: Cal y arena, 1993),
‘i Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of "the Other” and the
Myth ufModvmiiy (New York: Continuum, 1995),
32"]iirgenHaber-mas, Knotlzlrrdgcmid Human Interest, 30840,
it Francois Houtart, Sociologiudc la religion (Managua: Centre de Estudios Sobre
America, 1992) and Religion om’vdud y mermdu en el neolibcralismo (Mexico: Centro
de liivestigaciones lnterdisciplinurias en Ciencias y Humanidades, Coordinacion
llumanidades, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1997).
”Otto Maduro, Rl'ligic'my conicto social (Mexico: Centro de Estudios Ecumeni—
cos / Centre de Reexion teologica, 1978).
<
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reflections on popular religion as sociocultural resistance visv‘avvis
modernization and globalization,38
Analogously, there emerged around the same time a theology that
set out to critique its own eurocentric foundations, ground itself in the
reality of structural oppression, and develop a method that gives pride
of place to practice over theory, For example: Leonardo Bott’s ecclesiol‘
ogy,” Clodovis Boff’s epistemological and methodological reections}
and Ignacio Ellacuria’s writings on the prophetic and utopian func-
tions of Latin American theology.“
THE LIBERAL PARADIGM:
The following six socio-historical factors enabled and shaped the
development of the liberal paradigm, the dominant discourse in the
US. academy:
i. The crystallization of the bipolar system, the emergence of the
regime of international organizations, and the polemic between
realpolitik and human rights, or between hegemonic stability
and nee-liberal institutionalism, especially as this polemic mani'
tested itself in US. policy Vis~avvis Latin America."2
ii. McCarthyism and the specter of Marxism, especially vis-a-vis
the US. academic field}3
iii, The civil rights movement, 1960s radicalism, and the counter~
culture.“
M‘Cristian Parker, Religion 3/ clases subalternns urimrzas en una sacierilzd dependimzte:
Religiosidndpopular urbmm en America lntirm: 1m esludio do also en Chile (Louvainla-
Neuve: Centre de Recherches soda—religious ‘, 1986), and ()Im Logica an America
Latina: Rc’ligiérzPapillary Modernizacién Capitalism.
3" Leonardo Buff, [glen : curlsma y padcr (Santander: Sal ’I‘errae, l982).
“’Clodovis Boil, ”E stemologia y método de la teologia de la libei’acion,“
in Mysterium Liliemtionis: Concertos fimdrmmztales de la firologz’lzdo In liliemciori, eds.
Ignacio Ellacuria and Jon Sobrino (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1993) 79—114,
“Ignacio Ellacuria, ”Utopia y profetismo,” in Mystvrlum Liberatlorzis, 3934442.
“lohn Foster Dulles, A Dynamic Moral l’l‘Ircew/lmerica’s Opportunity (Baltimore:
Johns l’lopkins University, 1952); W. W. Rostow, The Stage ofEconomic Growth: A
Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962),- Henry
Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979); Idem, Years of Renewal
(New York: Simon ti: Schuster, 1999);}eanne], Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double
Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York: American Enterprise Instr
tote/Simon and Schuster, 1982).
“ Michael Paul Rogin, The Imellectzmls and McCarthy: The Radical Specter (Cam-
bridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1967).
MImmanuel Wallerstein and Paul Starr, The University Crisis Reader: The liberal
University Under Attack. Volume I: The Liberal University Under Attack (New York:
Random House, 197D; The University Crisis Reader: The Liberal University leler
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iv, The Chicago School of neoclassical economics, the rise of US.
”individualistic" capitalism, and the move toward regional eco—
nomic integration.“5
v. The second wave of immigration, the rise of multiculturalism
or identity politics, and the transformation of the field of US.
religion from the logic of “denominationalism” to the logic of
‘'corig.;regationalism.""6
vi. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the "triumph” of
democratic-capitalism.‘7
Against the backdrop of these socio-historical conditions, the philo»
sophical foundations of the liberal paradigm are more fully under-
stood, These are:
i. Intellectual genealogy: The liberal paradigm can be traced back
to the Enlightenment View that once freed from the yoke of
tradition, an autonomous reason would shepherd individuals
and societies toward progress and prosperity.“
Attack. Volume 11: Confrontation and Counterattack (New York: Random House,
1971); Robert Wuthnow, The Consciousness Reformation(Berkeley: University of Cali!
fornia Press, 1976); Michael Waller, Radical Principles: Reections of mi Llnrmm-
striated Democrat (New York: B ic Books, 1981)); and Steven M, Tipton, Griting
Saved From the Sixties (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
‘7 Paul A Samuelson, The Collected _ entic Papers, 11 (Cambridge: MIT Press,
19645),Book Three, ”Tracie, Welfare, and Fiscal Policy,” and Book Five, “Economics
~Past and Present," Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1962), and Lester C. Tliurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic
Bulllc Among lapel), Europe, and America (New York: Morrow, 1992):
*‘ Allen Maldwyn Jones, American Immigration, 2nd ed, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1993), Marilyn lloskin, Nm} Immigrants and Democratic Society(New
York: Praeger, 1991), Louise Lamphere, ed, Slrurlm‘irrgDiversity: EthnographicPrr
spectives on the New Immigration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), and
Robert Wutlinow, The Restructuring of Arrwriczm Religion (Princeton, NJ; Princeton
University Press, 1988).
'7 Michael Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (New York: Simon and
Schustcr, 1982), Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Mim (New York:
Free Press, 1992), Samuel P: llui‘ttington, “The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign
Affairs 72:3 (Summer 1993) 22-49.
“Th was the worldview presupposed by, for instance, the swcalled contract
iheoris .
.g, John Locke, Jeanslacqut‘s Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant (especially
when read as critic: )l the anthropological and political philosophical assumptions
of e,g,, Thomas i-lobbes, David Hume, and Baruch Spinoza)—th€ classical political
economistsMogu Adam Smith and David Ricardow—and the utilitariamH.g,,
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. See, also the historical studies of Karl I’olanyi,
The Great 'l'imisirrrmlimi (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), Louis Dumont, Essays on
Individualism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986) and lurgen Habermas,
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ii. Pragmatism: The liberal paradigm is ontologically grounded in
either a positivistic, empiricist, analytical, or a cultural-symbolic,
praxeological-communicative, and interpretative understand—
ing of reality. Both worldviews were given systematic form
through the school of thought known as pragmatism, the first
and probably only autochthonous school of US. thought,
which developed as a critique of the ontologizing philosophies
of Continental Europe.“
iii. Social theoretical assumptions: The liberal paradigm takes as its
social theoretical point of departure what Habermas has called
the “theory of social integration" which ”seeks to understand
the social system as a structure of harmoniously equalized and
enduring order . . ."W
iv. Conception of Justice: Liberal notions of justice, rooted in the
Enlightenment ideas of progress and stability and the pragmatic
critique of metaphysics and the philosophy of history,“ are
procedural, discursive, praxeologicalvcommunicative, and / or
formal52
v Epistemology: There exist two liberal epistemologies: one is
grounded in what Habermas has termed the "technical cogni-
tive interest” of the “empirical-analytic sciences” and the other
is grounded in what he has termed the “practical interest” of
the "historicalvhenneneutic sciences,”3
The Structural "l‘ransfornmtiunof the Public Sphere: An inquiry into a Cutvgory of Bour—
geois Society(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996).
“7 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers, Vol. ‘3,Pragmatism and Pragmatism
(Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Press, 1934), William James, ngnmtism
(Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1975); John Dewey, later Works, Vol, 11,
Liberalism and Social Actitm (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991);
Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis, Minn: Minnesota Univerv
sily Press, 1982) and Come! West, The Arnrrican Evasion ofPhilosophy:A Genealogyof
Pragmatism (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989),
fl‘liirgen Habermas, Theoryand Practice, 211).
5’ For example, Kawls’s idea that a theory of justice cannot be grounded in a
"comprehensive doctrine,“ See his ”Introduction” to the paperback edition of Politi~
cal Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). See also Jiirgen Haber!
mas, Poslmetrzplxysiculthinking (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992).
5ElohimRawls, Political Liberalism, Collected Papers (Cambridge, Mass; Harvard
University Press, 1999), Idem, The Law of Peoples, with "The Idea oi Public Reason
Revisited” (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University li’ress, 1999); )iirgen Habermas,
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 'I‘lxcuryofLaw and Democracy
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998); Idem, The Inclusion (y‘llzeOther: Studies; in
Political Theory(Cambridge, Mass; MIT Press, 1998).
‘ljiirgen I’Iabermas, Knowledgeand Human Interests, 308—10.
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In the United States the liberal paradigm provided the horizon for
an understanding of religion, as a carrier of certain political liberal
values which functions as a vehicle for social integration and mainte—
nance, and as a bulwark against the destructive forces of pernicious
individualism These are some of the more central contributions to this
tradition: The social historical and theoretical reflections of Alexis de
Tocqueville about the foundations of US, culture;M Talcott Parsons“
notion of “denominational pluralism”;~""’H. R. Niebuhr's sociology of
religion“ Robert Bellah’s notion of “civil religion” and his understand
ing of the relationship between individualism and religious values?7
Peter Berger’s sociological phenomenology of religion" discursive
theories of religion, ie, religion, communication, and public spheref”
ethnographic approaches to religion,M and religion as a promoter of
“goot
"
globalization,M
The liberal paradigm also provided the horizon for a liberal theol-
ogy of culture and dialogue that, for Protestant circles, emerged in the
nineteenth century with work of Ernst Troeltsch and was reinterpreted
by the Niebuhr brothers, Paul Tillich, and Gordon Kaufman,"2 and for
“ Alexis De
'1"ocqueville, l)mnomu‘y in America (New York: l’larper and Row,
1966) 444.
"-iTalcott Parsons, “Christianity,” in lnlrrrnallmml Encyclopedia of the Social
defences, ed. David 1,. Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968) 2425—47.
“’lwl. Richard Niebuhr, Smrlol Sources of Donomimuionallsm (Gloucester, Mass:
Peter Smith, 1987).
“‘7 Robert Bellah, ”Civil Religion in America,” in BeyondBalirf:Essays on erigimz
in a Posl«Tradllimml World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) 1684“),
"Unitarian Universalism in Societal Perspective,” presented at the Unitarian Uni~
versalist Association, General Assembly, Rochester, NY, June 27, 1998; and Robert
Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, Steven M. 'l‘ipton, Habits
of the Heart: Individualism and Crmimitmchl in Aviation: Life,updated edition with a
new introduction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996),
1“ Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elomr‘rtts Ufa Sociological Theory of Religion
(New York: Doubleday, 1967),
“Steven M. Tipton, “Public Theology,” The Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion
(Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998); Christian Smith, American Evongollcnlism
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
“‘R. 9. Warner, “Work in l’i'ogr s Towards a New Paradigm in the Sociological
Study ol' Religion in the United States,” American [oursz of Solsiology98:5 (March
1993) 1043433; Nancy Arnmerman, ”Telling Congregational Stories," Romero ofReli-
gious Research 35:4 (June 1994) 2891301 ; Penny Edgell Becker, Congregations in Con-
ict: Cultxmrl Models of Local ReligiousLife (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University
Press, 1999.
“1 Roland Robertson and William P. Garret, eds, Religion and Global Under (New
York: Paragon llouse, 1991).
”3 Ernst Trocltseh, The Social llftlt‘ltltlgsof tlur Christian Churches (Louisville: West-
minster/ John Knox Press, 1992); H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York:
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Roman Catholic circles emerged with Karl Rahner’s phenomenological
critique of Transcendental Thomism and Bernard Lonergan’s theologi-
cal method, and was developed by David Tracy, Robert Schrciter, and
others,“3
The Third 'llisk:
Reconstruction if the Genesis and Tmmirmation oftlw
Study of (1.5. Hispanic Religion
In the third task I am proposing for the critique of the study of US
Hispanic religion, we would deploy Bourdieu’s ethnographically moti‘
vated sociology of knowledge from below in an attempt to reconstruct
the genesis and transformation of the study of US. Hispanic religion:
What appeared as paradigms, viewed from above, become, from below,
stocks of knowledge that are ready to hand, In the same way that the
liberal and liberationist paradigms were enabled and limited by the
socio—historical conditions in which they emerged, the study of Latino
religion was enabled and limited, on the one hand, by the group of
scholars, set of intellectual practices, disciplines, stocks of knowledge,
and institutions that constituted that region of the US, academic field
dedicated to the production of discourses on 13.5, religion, and on the
other, by the socio-historical location of these elements. When applied
to the study of Latino religion, this critical sociology of the academic
field reveals that an intellectual tension between the liberationist and
liberal stocks of knowledge has defined the history of the study of His-
panic religion, More significantly, this tension is a manifestation in the
academic field of the marginalized status that characterizes I,.atinos in
the U.S.. The study of Hispanic religion will be plagued with distor—
tions so long as scholars of US, Latino religion fail to reect on the
socio—historical conditions of possibility for the invention and institu-
tionalization of Hispanic religion as an object of analysis in the U.S,
academic field.
Harper, 1956); Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953),- Paul ’lillich, Theology of Culture (London: Oxford
University Press 1989); Gordon Kaufman, ln Fury ofMystr’ry: ll Constructive Theology
(Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1993).
‘3 Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World (New York: Continuum, 1994); idem, Hymns of
the Word: Laying the Foundation for 11 Philosophy of Religion (New York: Continuum,
1994); Bernard Lonergan, Method in ”zoology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press
for l.,onergan Research institute of Regis College, 1971); Robert Schreiter, The New
Cutholicity; TheologyBetwem the, Global and the Low! (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,
1997); David Tracy, Plurality mill Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Horn (San Fran~
cisco: Harper and Row, 1987).
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As suggested, this reconstruction of the study of Latino religion
will require a dialectical approach analogous to the one developed in
the second task. First, we must elucidate the sociohistorical determi—
nants~both exogenous and endogenous to the US. academic field—
that led to the emergence and development of the subfield of Hispanic
religion, and to the structuring of the intellectual lmbilzls of both His-
panic and non-I iispanic scholars that produced Hispanic religion. And
second, we must analyze the development of the different arguments,
concepts, theories, and the like that undergirded the production of
scholarship on Latino religion This is to say that we must deconstruct
the way that Hispanic religion was constituted as an object of analysis
over time, but always understanding that these constructions were
enabled and shaped by the socio»historical factors elucidated. Given
the scale of this proposal such an approach cannot be developed here in
its full complexity and nuance. An outline of the central contours will
have to suffice
PRE'HIS'I‘ORY
For decades, before the study of Hispanic religion became institu-
tionalized as an object of analysis in the US, academy, there existed a
history of social scientific and theological reflections on, for instance,
the religion of Mexicans and Mexican~Americans in California and
Texas, Puerto Ricans in New York, Cubans and Cuban-Americans in
Miami. The crystallization of the category “l'lispanic religion” in the
academy was correlated with the demographic shift that transpired in
the country which led to the subsumption of particular and concrete
nationalities under an abstract and universal identity—viz, ”His—
panic/ Latino" This correlation is significant because it reveals the di-
alectical relationship that exists between the academic field and the
social totality, and more specifically, between intellectual and existen-
tial violence. The existential violence suffered by the Venezuelan, the
Salvadoran, the Dominican, who, identified and classied as Hispanic,
is negated his or her cultural and historical particularities, is dialecti-
cally related to the epistemological and ontological violence that takes
place in the academic sphere when a lecture or a study methodologi-
cally and/or theoretically suppresses the particularities of a Hispanic
person or group, This slippage between particular and universal, con—
crete and abstract gets to the existential uncertainty that must be the
point of departure for any study of US Hispanic reality, of which reli'
gion is a central aspect. However, both ethnic particularities and exis'
tential angst are suppressed by scholars in the name of methodological
and theoretical expediency, This is the problem with the ahistoricism,
pragmatism, and positivism of the liberal paradigm that dominates the
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US. academy. in the same way that political liberalism negates ethnic
particularities in order to create and integrate the abstract individual
citizen,M the categories and strategies used by the liberal academy
negates, at the theoretical level, the particularity of life forms in the
name of heuristic efficacy and effectiveness, and, at the methodologicallevel, negates the hermeneutical self-understanding of specific
ethnic/ racial individual groups in the name of the scientific method/‘7‘
and the “reexive” (Bourdieu) or "self-reflective” (liabermas) empiri-
cal question of what social group controls the processes by which this
or that method is “normalized," that is, becomes part of the regime of
“normal science"
GENESIS
Several decades ago, when the religious beliefs and practices of
Latinos were first “discovered” by intellectuals in the United States,
two factors endogenous to this newly emerging field of study over-
determined its structure, First, a disproportionate amount of those
scholars investigating Hispanic religiosity were themselves of Hispanic
origin; and second, the liberationist paradigm, which had always
existed at the periphery of the US, academy, held the most sway as the
frame of reference for the analysis of Hispanic religion In addition, two
exogenous factors—a demographic and a geopoliticaluhad significant
influence on the development of this emerging field: Latinos consti-
tuted a relatively small percentage of the US, population, and the Latin
American left still posed a viable alternative to what years later would
become known as neo-liberalism.
US. HISPANIC INTELLECTUALSAS THE.
”INVENroRs” or THE OBJECTor ANALYSIS
Hispanic religion as object of analysis emerged as the intellectual
aspect of the Hispanic struggle for recognition. With Bourdieu we need
to ask about the social location of the inventors as this empirical fact
‘" Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, nation, classe : [es identilés
amlrigué‘s(Paris: La l)ecouverte, 1988), This problem was also treated by the youngMarx. See “On the Jewish Question " and "An lntroduction to the Critique of I legel’s
PhilosophyofRight,” in The Marxiingcls Reader, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 1978).
“l One example of this violence can be found in the work being done in the soci—
ology of religion under the rubric “new immigrants,” where the political liberal in—
tegrationist interest which lurks behind all talk of "multiculturalism” and
"identity
politics" is internalized in ethnographic studies through the methodological and
theoretical assimilation of newly arrived immigrants» See, for example, Stephen
Warner, ”Work in Progress Towards a New Paradigm in the Sociological Study of
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always plays a role in the construction of the object of analysis."6On the
one hand, as intellectuals US. Hispanics are situated in a dominant
position among a dominated people; but, on the other hand, as His—
panics they are situated in a marginalized position in an academic
sphere dominated demographically by Euro—Americans and intellectu’
ally by the liberal paradigm U5. Hispanics invented Latino religion as
an object of analysis, first in theological circles in response to pastoral
needs, and later in social scientific circles as a critique of the ethnocen-
trism of the categories and theories used. The self—reectivelycritical
and “interested" nature of the first constructions of Hispanic religion
were very different to the more interpretative and “neutral” construc-
tions that would emerge years later when a greater number of non-
latino scholars became ”interested” in the study of Latino religion.
Tm: tiisrANic lN'l‘ELLEC’l‘UALHABI‘IUS
From the outset, Latino intellectuals, like all intellectuals that exist
at the limits of what is understood as "normal science," struggled with
the construction of the object of analysis. A tension existed between the
dominant liberal language that stressed the symbolic, praxeological,
cultural and integrationist aspects of religion and the liberationist lan—
guage that stressed the material, poietic, economic, and emancipatory
aspects. This tension was internalized in the Hispanic intellectual habi~
tus which was never able to synthesize with an academic field domi‘
nated by a liberal approach Initially, Hispanic intellectuals had ready
to hand stocks of knowledge unknown to the non~Hispanic intellec-
tual. This produced a hermeneutical tension that realized itself through
the marginalization of the first studies of Hispanic religion, and also
through a destabilized habitus. The language of liberation existed at
the margins. Not surprisingly, as elites Hispanic intellectuals were
more susceptible to assimilation via academic careers.”7 This tension
between liberation and liberalism is clearly present in the early works
of the first studies of Latino religion.“ These studies will need to be de-
Religion in the United States,” and Stephen Warner and Judith G. Wittner, ed, Guth-
m‘ings in Diaspora: Religious Cummunilics and the New Immigration (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1998).
it Pierre liourdieu, Home amdemicus, M434.
‘3"
rantz Fanon addres. : an analogous issue in Les dummis dc la terrc (Paris:
Franct Maspero, 1961). He critically analyzes the tendency of the African elite to
be in cahoots with the colonial powers as they had the most to lose from the wars of
liberation given their symbolic and material capital,
"5! will mention two examples: rst, the slippage that exists in Virgilio Eli-
zondo’s use, of the term mcsiizajc: Sometimes Elizondo signs this nomenclature in
such a way that gives it an integrationisbliberal meaning and other times in such a
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constructed in order to tease out the tension between liberalism and
liberation that defined the structure of the, subfield of Us. Hispanic
religion.
TRANSFORMATION
Gradually, as Latino religion became institutionalized as an obiect
of analysis in the us. academy, an increasing number of non-l lispanic
scholars began to gain interest in this new phenomenon, and the liberal
approach, which had historically been the dominant intellectual world-
view among US. academics, began to exert more influence as the
rubric of analysis in this particular field. Thus was intensified what
Bourdieu has called the symbolic struggle over the monopoly of legiti'
mate nomination.W As to the two exogenous factors, this transforma
tion of the field of US. Hispanic religion was paralleled by a precipitous
increase in the population of US. Latinos, and the demise of the Latin
American left. Eventually, there came a point when both the libera-
tionist and liberal paradigms came to marshal substantial epistemo—
logical, methodological, and theoretical leverage in the study of
US. Hispanic religion. As these endogenous and exogenous factors
unfolded and interacted, however, a moment arose when the liberal
discourse began to exert greater influence, gradually eclipsing the
liberationist perspective. I refer to this development—a development
that continues today—as the liberalization of the liberalirmist paradigm. In
US. Hispanic theology, the liberalization of the liberationist paradigm
manifests itself as the ”aesthetic turn.” And in the social sciences this
phenomenon manifests itself as the eclipse of the question of power in
the sociological analysis of US. Latino popular religion.
THE AESTHETIC TURN
I argue that the aesthetic turn in US. l’lispanic theology is an ex-
ample of intellectual assimilation. This development needs to be ana—
lyzed from the perspective of a critical sociology of knowledge and
revealed for what it is: the theological aspect of the liberalization of the
liberationist paradigm. In a previous essay, I asked why it is
way that gives it a emancipatory-liberationist one. See, for example, his Galilean
Ioumcy: The Mexican-American Promise (Maryknoll, NY; Orbis, 1985). ,econd, the
tension that has existed between the terms mujtrrz’staand feminism which is no doubt
a function of the dialectical relationship between, on the one hand, the way Latin
American and Anglo American intellectual discourses on women are negotiated,
and on the other hand, how the negotiators, viz,, Hispanic women theologians,
grapple with the existential crisis of living in the US.
“ Pierre Bourdieu, Homo ncadrmirus, 4i.
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that U15. l’lispanic theology does not tarry with the negative, the mon-
strosity of marginalization and struggle? While it acknowledges the
socioeconomic struggle of U8. l..atinas/os, it sublimates this struggle into
an aesthetic praxis which gives pride of place to the procession over the
necessity of production, which accentuates the liturgy while eclipsing
the reality of labor, which underscores the fiesta while ignoring the daily
eight—to-five of the lartory, But by doing this, theology remains an ab.
straction, an intellectual idca. Stated in another way, rather than formu-
lating an aesthetics that is grounded and shaped by the totality of
reality—which for the majority of Latinas/o3 includes the real, everyday
struggle of “making" a living~U.S. Hispanic theology, either deduces an
idea of struggle from an a priori aesthetics, or worse, it brackets the
dimension of struggle all together. But if US. Hispanic theology aims to
become more than an abstraction, and accepts to tarry with the totality of
US. Hispanic reality.both positive and negative-writen it must attempt
to overcome the praxis-poiosis diremption which it itself posits; it needs
to do this, for example—if we an: talking "aesthetics"—through an
aesthetics of struggle which only later can be subluled into an aesthetics of
celebration. If, however, US. Hispanic theology opts not to accept this
task of overcoming, then it must heed the lesson of Kant/s critical phi-
losophy and stay within the epistemological limits of its narrowly de—
fined program, i.e., put more concretely, US. Hispanic theology must
refrain from aostheticizing the monstrosity of marginalization and
struggle, it must refrain from reducing the totality of US. Hispanic real-
ity to an a prior! aesthetics of celebration. Will the cominngf-age of US.
Hispanic theology necessarily result in the distancing of theological dis-
course, from tho everyday struggle of the Latino/o community? in other
words, my th s that US. l’lispanic theology is currently undergoing
an "aesthetic turn” which is having the onerous effect of distancing theo-
logical discourse away from the everyday struggles of an economically,
Culturally, and politically dominated U5. Latina/o community-an
effect which could in the long-term alienate US. Hispanic theologians
from their community. Two moments of this “aesthetic turn” need to be
highlighted at the outset: The first moment is Epistemologiml.The fact that
an overwhelming amount of attention is being dedicated to aesthetic the«
ory suggests that little attention is being given to other ways of knowing,
such as, for instance, social scientic and critical theoretical approaches.
The second moment is ontological. By biasing the aesthetic, Latina / o
theologians are implying that the defining characteristic or element of
us. Hispanic reality is the experience of the beautiful. For to deny this
presupposition would be to admit that US, Latina/o theological dis»
course is an intellectualized abstraction which does not correspond with
the cverydayncss of US. lilispanic reality. But how about the reality of
domination? When those two moments are combined and the ‘acsthetic
turn’ in US Latina / o theology is considered comprehensively, the fol-
lowing concern arises: The coming-obage of a theological discourse
dominated by a theoretical and empirical concern for the aesthetic that
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consequently has a tendency of red ucing the complexity of US. Hispanic
reality to the beautiful/"i
THE Econ“; or THE QUESHON or Powm
The eclipse of the question of the relationship between power and
popular religion is an example of the liberalization of the liberationist
paradigm in the sociology of US. Hispanic religion. Any use of the
concept "popular religion," it it is to be consistent with the genealogy
of the nomenclature, necessarily needs to address the issue of religious
power, and specifically engage the relationship between popular reli-
gion and domination. But, as l have suggested elsewhere
{Tlhis already poses a problem for US. sociology of religion, for as l have
suggested, do to socio-historical distortions which are revealed to us by
Bourdieu’s critical sociology of knowledge, the maiority of US. sociolo—
gies of religion have failed to substantially address this sue of religious
interest and power. For example, I recently reviewed over three decades
of articles published in the journals Sociologyuj'Religion, jnm'imljbr the
Scientific Study of Rttligion,Cristianismu y Socicdad, and Social Compass and
I found that the European and Latin American journals had substantially
more articles that were directly dealing with issues of religious interest
and power. Why is it, moreover, that among the many studies of His-
panic popular religion that have recently emerged in the U.S., none has
attempted to engage the relationship that exits between the fact that in
thc US. a disproportionate amount of religious symbols and expressions
that are termed “popular” are of Hispanic origin, and this groups than
ginalized place in US. society? This hiatus, l argue, is a symptom of the
biases present in US. sociology of religion. Structurally does a homology
exist between the instrumentalization of Mexican culture by the fastvtood
aphorism—Yn quiem Taco Bell—«or the commodificaition and consump—
tion of the Hispanic culture as the "exotic” and "erotic” as illustrated by
the recent popularity of Latinos such as Jennifer Lopez, Enrique lglesias,
and Ricky Martin, and the categorization of Hispanic beliefs and prac‘
tices as "popular”? In other words, does a structural homology exist
between the position of Hispanics in the US. cultural field and their
position in the US. religious field? ln order to engage this question and
do justice to it US. sociology of religion needs to push beyond the ”inte-
grationist” presuppositions that have historically kept it from develop-
ing a critical theory of US. religious interests and power. This bias
manifests itself today through the phenomenological analysis of popular
religion that has recently come to dominate under the new rubric of
ethnographic sociology. It the concept of popular religion is to be used
”Manuel 1. Mejido, ”A Critique of the ’Acsthetic Turn’ in Us. Hispanic Theol'
ogy: A Conversation with Roberto Goizueta and the, Positing of a New Paradigm,”
journal of Hispanic Theology8:3 (February 2001) 18.23,
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in a way that is free from the biases of US. sociology of religion, then
critical-historical and structural approaches need to be marshaled. Only
this way will the power dynamic that is played out in the religious field,
and, which, through structural homologies, extends to other social fields,
can be uncovered.“
Only on extremely rare occasions have scholars of US. Hispanic
religion recognized this transformation 1 am calling here the liberaliza-
tion of the liberationist paradigm in its full complexity, either as a
positive or negative phenomenon. More often, only its surface manifes-
tations have been acknowledged either through a critique of the liberal
paradigm for occluding the structural asymmetries which adversely
affect US. Hispanics, or through a repudiation of the liberationist para-
digm for being displaced and anachronistic, that is, for being ill—suited
to address the seem-religious dynamics that exist in modem industrial-
ized societies, the US. in particular. For the most part, however, what
I am calling the liberalization of the liberationist paradigm has tran-
spired silently, without much recognition, and can be detected only by
tracing the genealogy of the study of US. Hispanic religion, and more
specifically, the deconstruction of assumptions, text milieus, methods,
theories, and concepts that together constitute the history of this area of
study. The critical reection on the socio-historical determinants that
mediated and shaped the study of Latino religion, however, suggests
that the tension that has existed between the liberal and liberationist
approaches to l‘lispanic religion is the academic or intellectual manifes—
tation of the general social process of Latino assimilation into the US.
mainstream.
The Fourth Task:
Recunsrtuction of the Grnesis and "Transformationof the
Study of US, Hispanic Religion
In the fourth and nal task involved in the critique of the study of
us. Hispanic religion as l envision it, we should aim to construct a
new ground for the study of Latina/o religion; this ground should
draw on the critical philosophical and theoretical tradition which have
been historically absent from our intellectual genealogies. Thus, the
reconstruction of the emergence and development of US. Hispanic
religion, carried out in the third task, now becomes a prolegomenon for
7‘ Manuel 1. Mejido, "The Illusion ot Neutrality: Reflections on the Term ‘t’opu-
lar Religion‘,” Social Compass,(Forthcoming; Winter, 2002). See also my ”Theoretical
Prolegomenon to the Sociology of US. l-lispanic Popular Religion” [mmml of
Hispanic/[attire Theology7:1 (August 1999) 27554.
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the ground laying, as it unmasks the socio—historical struggles that
suffuse the intellectual discourses on Hispanic religion, revealing the
intellectual aspect of the general struggle against assimilation. Hence,
our new approach to Latino religion will consist of two tasks: first, the
task of critiquing the US. academic field via the destabilization of
dominant interpretations; second, the task of constructing a new ground
for the study of Us. Hispanic religion that aims to push beyond the
liberation-liberalism dichotomy that holds sway in the US, academy.
This new ground should consist of two moments: the phenomenology
of struggle as the point of departure for the elucidation of US. l-iis-
panic reality; and the dialectic of ideology and emancipation as the
proper movement of us. Hispanic religion.
DESTABILIZA‘I’ION OF THE US. ACADEMY VIA THE
CONSCIOUS REPUDIATION or INTELLECTUAL AssiMimnoN
US. Hispanic theologians and scholars of religion should not be
afraid to turn our weapons of analysis on ourselves, to perform the
quixotic gesture of reflexivity. In the business of interpreting the world,
intellectuals tend to fall captive to what Pierre Bourdieu calls "scholas-
tic epistemocentrism."72 That is, failing to understand themselves as
“empirical subjects," intellectuals often do not reect on the fact that
their scholarly activities are practices that are socio-hisiorically situ-
ated, structured, on the one hand, by the position they occupy in an
academic field, and, on the other, by the positions they occupy in other
social fields—eg, the economic and political fields, the field of power,
and the like,73 Intellectuals in democratic-capitalist societies like the
United States have a proclivity for performing this epochs? on the socio—
historical determinants of academic discourses because of the domi~
nance-both in terms of forms of thought and forms of life—of a
praxeological-in’rerpretative and symbolic-cultural bias that views the
academic field as the epitome of undistorted reasonable and rational
communication. The project critical theorists from Georg Lukécs to
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak have called the critique of political liberal-
ism and capitalism—which is always an intellectual project, ie, it is
always an intellectual’s project—must, therefore, begin with the cri-
tique of the internalization by the academic field of those modes of
thought that emerged together with democratic-capitalism, which, in
praxeological terms, becomes the practice of destabilizing an academic
field via the repudiation of its dominant worldviews. The critique of
the tyranny of capital must begin with the critique of the tyranny of
""2 Pierre Bourdieu, Mt‘tlitntirms pascalicrmes(Paris: Seuil, 1907) 64-4774.
“Pierre Bourdieu, Home acudmnicus, 34—52.
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"normal science" which is always the science practiced by those a so—
ciety regards as “normal,” that is, it is the science practiced by those
that speak the customary language, posses the average physiology and
physiognomy, are immersed in the typical text milieus, and deploy the
dominant problem solving tactics and strategies.
Moreover scholastic epistemocentrism does particular violence to
those discourses on the social reality of minority groups as it suppresses
the distortions produced by the internalization of the contradictions
and tensions that suffuse a society, thus reenlorcing the oppression of
that group, now in the academic realm The critique of the idea that order
and progress can be achieved via praxis alone (an idea that reaches its
zenith with ”multiculturalism" and “identity politics”) must begin
with the critique of the "consensus theory of trut ” and the idea of the
possibility of an integrated ”community of scientists,” The critique of
the tyranny of the majority must begin with the critique of the tyranny
of dominant interpretations, which are always the interpretations of
the dominant From this perspective, the task of US‘ Hispanic intelleo
tuals that claim to expound a liberationist approach must begin with
the unmasking of intellectual assimilation“
The political liberal belief in the possibility of a harmonious multi-
culturalism equilibrated and adjusted via discourse, participation, and
correct procedures, exemplified in the idea of the public sphere,“ ap—
pears in the academic realm as the belief in the possibility of an inte-
"‘ “Scholastic epistemocentrisiri" has prevented even the most critical of scholv
ars from reflecting on the larl‘ that scholarship is a specific type of social practices
located in a specific social space, viz., the academic field, and as such it manifests
the contradictions and tensions of a society, Intellectual production and the aca-
demic realm are not immune lo the distortions and interests of social asymmetries
and struggles, but rather they have to be understood as loci of this struggle, ie,
they have to be understood as the intellectual components of this struggle. It would
be naive to think that intellectual activity can be divorced from an intellectuals life~
world and position in the system; which is to say that it would be naive to think that
intellectual activity can he divorced from a social totality. Homo amdrmirus is also
Home palitims, rcunumicus, and the like. And this holds, a fortiori, for discourses on
the social world as intellectuals cannot escape the investments they have in the
world they aim to analyze, and for liberal‘democratic societies as they internalize in
the academic field the worldview that intersubjeclivilywvie, communication tree of
distorllonw is a given as opposed to something that is achieved through the dialec‘
tic of recognition which alway implies negation and violence, This is why it is not
surprising that political liberalisxn~»—especiallyUS, style liberalism—is more in-
debted to the positive philosophy of identity than it is to the philosophy of mega“
tion in the case of the US, this can be traced back to the pragmatic critique of
dialec
'
and sociwhistorically lo the Cold War, McCarthyism, and the like.
7"
rgen l’labermas, The Structuml Transjbrmatinn(f the Public Sphere:An Inquiry
into a Category {7fBourgeoisSociety(Cambridge, Mas Ml’l“ Press, 1989),
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grated community of diverse scholars which can, through reasoned
communication and correct procedures, achieve a consensus on this or
that interpretation, or, at the very least, agree to disagree. However in
the same way that in democratic-capitalist ‘ocieties the silent domina'
tion of minority groups holds sway beneath the ideologies of political
correctness, identity politics, talk of reform without structural change,3
in the liberal academic field, that is, the academic fields of liberal socie—
ties, the silent domination of minority intellectuals holds sway beneath
the ideology of a participatory culture where everyone is encouraged
to speak from his or her point of View. Agreeing to disagree is the
diplomacy of the intellectual elite, who, like the political elite, score a
victory if pacification is achieved, In the academic field this victory is
realized via the normalization of the dominant paradigms. The domi-
nant interpretations will always be the interpretation of the dominant,
and “normal science” will always be the science of the “normal." Those
minority intellectuals who through a critical consciousness have resisted
the internalization of the dominant worldviews, will always remain at
the margins of the academy just like their people remain at the margins
of society Why should it be any different? The only thing that could
blur this reality is the assimilationist tendencies of the minority intel-
lectual who, as an elite among his or her people, is more susceptible to
selling out, That such a propensity exists is clear from the reconstruc-
tion of the genesis and transformation of the study US. Hispanic reli-
gion, and specically from the process we have called the liberalization
of the liberationist paradigml
Thus, those minority intellectuals that claim to struggle for the
betterment of their people must not forget about the important task of
transforming the dominant interpretations of the world, Here the criti-
cal race theorists serve as an example who for sometime now have
been taking as their point of departure the critique of US. law schools,
in particular their liberal structures and pedagogical practice With
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, therefore, the task of the critical in-
tellectual qua intellectual is the critique of the US. academy as a central
component of the democratic—capitalist“machine.”8 As for the intellec-
tual qua activist, this is another story.
7" David Schwelckart, Against Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass.
versity Press, 1993),
_
, N ‘
”Se
,
for instance, the introduction to Kimbetle C rcnshaw, Neil (,xolancla, (xary
Feller, and Kendall Thomas, C riticul Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the
Movement {New York: The New Press, W95)
, p p .
”Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Capltalismc ct schizophrenia (Paris: Minuit,
19754980).
'kmbridge Uni~
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Why are we afraid to be polemical? One thing should be said to all
those academic elites in the United States that, because of a lack of a
critical consciousness, discriminate against the intellectual traditions of
ruleser America: beware of the demographic transition, it comes ”like a
thief in the night.”
A New GROUND
1n the space opened up by the destabilization of dominant interpre-
tations, we need to construct a new ground for the study of US, His“
panic religion that is, on the one hand, free from the distortions of
intellectual assimilation, and, on the other, critical vis—Ervis the function
of the religion of minorities in liberalodemocratic societies. As sug-
gested above, this ground laying should consist of two moments: First,
the delineation of the phenomenology of struggle as the primordial ele-
ment of US, Hispanic reality, In a past essay, through a retrieval of
Xavier Zubiri‘s critique of the pernicious idealism of Western philosoo
phy and the materialist and liberationist re-interpretation of the
Zubirian system by Ignacio Ellacurla, I attempted to establish the
philosophical horizon for this phenomenology” The next step should
be the empirico-existential elucidation of this nomenclature. Second, in
light of this phenomenology of struggle empirico-existentially under—
stood, the dialectical relationship between the ideological and emanci-
patory elements of US Hispanic religion needs to be developed as our
primary heuristic device Let us make manifest, for instance, both the
ideological and emancipatory aspects of nzestizaje, popular religion,
teoloogia de ronjuntu, praxis, and the like Once we are able to reflectively
engage our own contradictions, and once we immerse ourselves in
these contradiction and work in and through them, then we will be
getting somewhere
Conclusion
flow can we engage in the struggle for the, liberation of our people
if we ourselves are in chainsA the chains of intellectual assimilation—
and yet believe to be free? Reflexivity in the form of the critique of the
study of U S Hispanic religion is the power to break free of these
chains. Consider Tomas Gutierrez Alea s Hash: ( ierto Punto (1983) as an
illustration of the emancipatory function of the reexive gestures This
film about making a film undergirds the dialectical process by which
an intellectual comes to terms with his own repressed sexism, Oscar, a
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well-respected dramaturge, accepts to write a screenplay for a film
about the problems of tmwhismo among the waterfront workers in la
Habana, In the process of conducting the research, he falls in love with
Lina, a dock worker he decides to use as the model for the protagonist
of the film because of her critical feminist consciousness, As their love
affair deepens and intensities, Oscar’s nmchista tendencies slowly he-
come manifest; and, through this therapeutic gaining of consciousness,
he finds himself compelled to change the entire premise of hit, screen.
play. Is Oscar not the quintessential intellectual who, deluded by the
chimera of a superior consciousness, is forced to come to terms with
the fact that he is dialectically related to his subject matter, to his object
of analysis?
I pose to my colleagues a challenge analogous to the one Oscar had
to face, and it is the critique of the study of Hispanic religion, [5 the dialec~
tic of reflexivity not a way of recasting one of the central insights of
liberation theology, namely, that all theology and intellectual produc—
tion that fails to reect on its own socio-historical conditions of possi—
bility is potentially oppressive, part of the problem?
